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STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JACK WILKINSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20070325-CA 
HUH I OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS Ol HI \ i 1 \\ 
Whether the trial court erred in denying Wilkinson's motion to suppress evidence 
obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure. This issue presents a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ^ f 15, 103 P.3d 699. This issue 
was preserved in a motion to suppress (R. 54-44). 
( <) Ml'III >I I IIVC STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The text of all relevant statutory and constitutional provisions is set forth in the 
Addenda. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case 
Jack Wilkinson appeals from the judgment and sentence of the Honorable Samuel 
McVey, Fourth District Court, after the denial of his motion to dismiss and his conviction 
by a jury of illegal possession of a controlled substance in a drug free zone, a second 
degree felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a Class A 
misdemeanor. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Jack Virgil Wilkinson, Jr., was charged by criminal information filed on May 30, 
2006, in Fourth District Court with possession of a controlled substance in a drug free 
zone, a second degree felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a 
Class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) and 58-
37a-5a respectively (R. 04-03). Wilkinson posted $5,000 cash bond and signed a promise 
to appear for June 2, 2006 (R 06-05). On June 2, 2006, Wilkinson was advised of the 
charges and their penalties and elected to retain counsel (R. 09-08). 
On June 27, 2006, at counsel's request, Judge McVey granted a continuance until 
July 10, 2006, (R 12-11), on which day the case was continued to July 17, 2006 (R. 15-
14). On July 17, 2006, Judge McVey issued a bench warrant for Wilkinson, who failed to 
appear because he was incarcerated in the Utah State Prison after being sentenced on 
other charges (R. 22, 18-16). 
On September 11, 2006, Wilkinson requested a 120-day disposition, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-29-1(1) (1999) (R. 23). 
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Judge McVey appointed the Office of the Public Defender to represent Wilkinson 
on October 30, 2006, (R. 25, 178: 2), and granted counsel's motion for a continuance to 
November 20, 2006 (R. 26-25, 178: 4-5). On November, 14, 2006, Wilkinson's 
appointed counsel, Anthony Howell, filed a Withdrawal of Counsel, and referred the case 
to conflict counsel, John Penrod, (R. 31), who moved for a continuance, which was 
granted, to December 4, 2006, (R. 34-33). On December 4 Wilkinson requested a 
preliminary hearing, which was set for December 11, 2006 (R. 36). At the end of the 
preliminary hearing on December 11, Wilkinson was bound over on the charges upon a 
finding of probable cause, and the arraignment was scheduled for December 18, 2006 (R. 
39-38, 173: 18-19). At the arraignment, Wilkinson entered not guilty pleas to both 
charges and requested a jury trial, which was scheduled for January 3 and 4, 2007, (R. 
42-41). The Court recognized the 120-day disposition request and specifically chose the 
trial dates to fall within 120 days of September 11, 2006, the day Wilkinson filed the 
request (R. 174:3). 
On December 26, 2006, Mr. Penrod filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained 
as a result of the search and seizure of Wilkinson, (R. 44), on the grounds that 
information given by a confidential informant to the arresting officer was too vague to 
support the traffic stop, and that the officer's personal observations did not and could not 
have confirmed the informant's vague tip (R. 51-46). An evidentiary hearing on the 
motion to suppress was never set. (R. 175: 4). On December 29, 2006, Mr. Penrod filed a 
motion for Judge McVey to recuse himself because Wilkinson believed that Judge 
McVey was biased against him (R. 57). The Honorable Anthony W. Schofield, Fourth 
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District Court, denied the motion to recuse on January 4, 2007, five days after the motion 
was filed (R. 76-75). Also on December 29, Mr. Penrod filed a motion to dismiss the 
drug free zone charges against Wilkinson, (R. 59) based on evidence that the alleged 
offenses did not occur within 1,000 feet of a public park, (R. 67), and that the baggy and 
dollar bill found on Wilkinson's person could not be considered drug paraphernalia (R. 
66-65). This motion was not considered until Judge McVey denied it at a pretrial 
conference on March 12, 2007 (R. 175: 5-6) 
Wilkinson sent a letter dated December 24, 2006 to Mr. Penrod, (R. 84), which 
Mr. Penrod received on or before January 2, 2007, (R. 83), one day before the scheduled 
commencement of Wilkinson's trial. In the letter, Wilkinson clearly expressed his desire 
to go ahead with the scheduled trial (R. 84). In a letter written to Wilkinson and hand 
delivered on January 2, 2007, Mr. Penrod acknowledged Wilkinson's letter, but advised 
Wilkinson that "[l]he evidence is against us" and that he should again consider taking the 
offered plea bargain (R.83-81). Wilkinson advised the court of this exchange in a letter 
postmarked January 4, 2007, and filed January 5, 2007 (R. 85). 
Mr. Penrod filed a motion to withdraw as counsel on January 5, 2007, citing 
Wilkinson's desire to not be represented by Mr. Penrod, and Wilkinson's unwillingness 
to "listen to his counsel with respect to protecting his rights," and alleging that Wilkinson 
called him profane names. (R. 78). 
On January 22, 2007, Judge McVey again appointed the Office of the Public 
Defender to Wilkinson's case and attributed the delay to the defense. (R. 179: 3-4). A 
date for a new preliminary hearing was set for February 5, 2007. (R. 88, 179:4). A letter 
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from Wilkinson to the Court dated January 23, 2007, and filed on January 26, 2007, 
reiterated that Wilkinson's trial did not go forth on January 3 as he wished, and that the 
time had expired on his 120-day disposition request. (R. 90). 
At the preliminary hearing on February 5, 2007, Judge McVey charged the delay 
caused by Mr. Penrod's withdrawal and the subsequent continuance of the trial to the 
defendant, Wilkinson (R. 180: 2-3). Jose Silva, who was appointed to Wilkinson's case, 
requested 30 days to prepare for the trial, (R. 180: 5), which was set for March 16, 2007, 
with a pretrial conference set for March 5 (R. 93, 180: 7). At the March 5 pretrial 
conference, the Court moved to continue the conference to March 12, 2007, and 
instructed the State to prepare a transportation order for Wilkinson to be transported from 
the Utah State Prison (R. 109-108). 
At the pretrial conference on March 12, Judge McVey denied Wilkinson's motion 
to dismiss, holding that whether the baggy allegedly found on Wilkinson's person was 
paraphernalia, and whether Wilkinson was within 1,000 feet, were questions of fact for 
the jury. (R. 175: 5-6). Judge McVey also denied the motion to dismiss based on the 120-
day disposition request, holding that the delays were charged to the defendant, and not to 
the State or the Court (R. 175: 13). However, Judge McVey did not charge the delay of 
getting Wilkinson to the Court from prison to Wilkinson (R. 175: 12-13). The State 
requested an opportunity to address the motion to suppress on the morning of the trial, 
March, 16, 2007, and it was granted (R. 111, 175: 3-4). 
The day of the trial, Judge McVey denied the motion to suppress, finding probable 
cause to stop the vehicle, and to pat down Wilkinson (R. 118, 176: 66-69). The trial then 
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went forward and ended with a verdict on the same day. The jury found Wilkinson guilty 
as charged (R. L18, 176: 173-74). 
Wilkinson was sentenced on April 9, 2007? to terms of one to fifteen years in the 
Utah State Prison for the second degree felony, and less than one year for the Class A 
misdemeanor, both to run concurrently with Wilkinson's current prison sentence. (R. 
166-65). 
On April 12, 2007, Wilkinson's pro se notice of appeal was filed in the Fourth 
District Court (R. 171-68). This matter was subsequently transferred to this Court by the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Testimony From Preliminary Hearings: December 11, 2006; March 16, 2007 
Officer Troy Bebe testified that a confidential informant told him that Mary Albert 
would be purchasing methamphetamine in Salt Lake City (R. 173: 4). The informant told 
him that he had arranged for Albert to call him to tell him when she was returning and 
where she was so they could meet at her residence so the informant could purchase 
methamphetamine from her (R. 173: 4). The informant told Bebe that Albert had called 
him and that she was heading from Orem to Provo via back roads near RC Willey (R. 
173: 4-5). The informant told Bebe that Gene Brassher, Albert's son, was in the car with 
her, and Bebe testified that "that was all" (R. 173: 9). But at the hearing just prior to the 
trial, Bebe said that the informant told him that Wilkinson was in the car (R. 176: 39). 
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Officers Bebe, Cajonnis, and Edwards waited in an unmarked vehicle near 
Albert's residence and spotted the vehicle described by the informant (R. 173: 5). As he 
initiated the traffic stop, Bebe "observed all of the occupants in the vehicle making 
[furtive] movements towards the floorboards of the vehicle and the back of the vehicle" 
(R. 173: 5). Later, Bebe said that it was the rear, passenger side passenger who was 
reaching to the back of the vehicle (R. 176: 54). Bebe said that it was the furtive 
movements that caused him to ask the driver to exit the vehicle, for his "safety and the 
safety of the other officers" (R. 173: 5). When the driver exited the vehicle, Bebe noticed 
a syringe cap on the floor of the vehicle toward the back of the driver's seat (R. 173: 5). 
Once the occupants of the vehicle had exited, officers found two syringes in the seat back 
pocket of the front passenger's seat (R. 176: 56). Wilkinson was seated directly behind 
the driver (R. 176:43). 
Bebe testified that once the stop was made and the driver had exited the vehicle, 
everyone remaining in the vehicle was under investigation and not free to leave (R. 173: 
14). Bebe's conversation with the driver was "[v]ery short," with Bebe merely asking 
him if he had any weapons or contraband on him (R. 173: 15). Bebe testified that he then 
"requested each of the passengers to individually exit the vehicle" in part because of the 
"information provided by the confidential informant" (R. 173: 6). However, the 
confidential informant did not tell Bebe that anyone else in the vehicle was doing 
anything illegal (R. 173: 9-10). After searching the driver, instead of questioning Albert, 
the only individual specifically named by the confidential informant to be purchasing 
methamphetamine, (R. 176: 49), Bebe asked Wilkinson to exit the vehicle, which he did, 
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and proceeded to search him (R. 173: 6). Bebe testified that it was items he had already 
pulled from Wilkinson's pockets that made him believe Wilkinson may have had a 
weapon (R. 176: 57). Bebe testified that he found a baggy and a folded dollar bill on 
Wilkinson, both containing a white, crystalline substance (R. 173: 6, 15-16). No drugs 
were found on Albert's person during the traffic stop (R. 176: 53). 
Trial Testimony 
The trial took place on March 16, 2007, despite Wilkinson's filing of a 120-day 
disposition request on September 11, 2006. 
A. Testimony of Mary Albert 
On the morning of Wilkinson's arrest, Mary Albert was returning home from Salt 
Lake City where she purchased methamphetamine (R. 176: 80). She was a passenger in 
the vehicle in which Wilkinson was also riding (R. 176: 80). Albert remembers very little 
from the day in question, and was essentially testifying about what other people and the 
police reports had told her (R. 176: 86). She said that an officer told her that there was a 
recording of her saying she had purchased methamphetamine (R. 176: 83). 
B. Testimony of Officer Troy Bebe 
Troy Bebe is a Provo City police officer who is assigned to the Utah County 
Major Crimes Task force and who has three years experience on the narcotics task force 
(R. 176: 88). Bebe has also been trained on the "drug culture," (R. 176: 89), and is trained 
and licensed as a drug recognition examiner (R. 176: 94-95). 
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On a tip from a confidential informant, Bebe was specifically looking for Mary 
Albert's vehicle on May 24, 2006 (R 176: 89). At approximately 3:00AM, Bebe observed 
the vehicle turn toward his unmarked minivan, (R. 176: 90), near Mary Albert's 
residence, which is located at 658 North, 970 West in Provo (R. 176: 77). Bebe observed 
Albert and Wilkinson in the vehicle (R. 176: 90). He also saw people in the back seat 
reaching to the back of the vehicle, and Albert "sink down in her seat and then come back 
up" before the car stopped (R. 176: 91). Upon stopping the vehicle, Bebe first contacted 
the driver, asked him to step out, and patted him down (R. 176: 93). Bebe then proceeded 
to Wilkinson's passenger door and asked him to step out of the vehicle (R. 176: 93). 
Bebe testified that Wilkinson's "skin tone was flush, that he also had red, 
bloodshot eyes and dilated pupils" (R. 176: 93). From his experience, Bebe concluded 
Wilkinson's physical characteristics were consistent with the use of methamphetamine 
(R. 176: 94). Upon searching Wilkinson's person, Bebe found a dollar bill folded into a 
"bindle" in Wilkinson's left front pants pocket, and a baggy in Wilkinson's shirt pocket 
(R. 176: 95, 103-04). According to Bebe, the bindle contained a "white, crystallis 
substance" believed to be methamphetamine, and the baggy contained a white powder (R. 
176: 95). Bebe put the evidence in baggies at the Utah County Sheriffs Department after 
the incident (R. 176: 97). Bebe conducted no sort of field drug test on Wilkinson during 
the stop (R. 176: 102). On the morning of the trial, Bebe used a "roll-a-tape" to measure 
the distance from the site of the traffic stop to the Provo River bike trail, which he 
calculated to be 378 feet (R. 176: 92). 
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C. Testimony of Ryan Barney 
Ryan Barney is a forensic scientist at the state crime lab (R. 176: 111). He has 
tested approximately 3,000 samples, about 1,000 of which have tested positive for 
methamphetamine (R. 176: 112). The substance found in the Wilkinson's possession 
tested positive for methamphetamine, (R. 176: 116), but the substance had been separated 
from its containers (the bindle and the baggy) before Barney received it (R. 176: 118). 
D. Testimony of Janice Fusco-Wilkinson 
Janice Fusco-Wilkinson is Wilkinson's wife, and she was seated in the back seat 
of the vehicle with Wilkinson at the time of the traffic stop (R. 176: 129). Fusco-
Wilkinson testified that she never saw Wilkinson with drugs the day prior to the traffic 
stop (R. 176: 133). She said that she knew that Albert and Wilkinson were using 
methamphetamine, but that she did not know that the purpose of the trip to Salt Lake City 
was to buy methamphetamine (R. 176: 140). 
E. Testimony of Jack Virgil Wilkinson, Jr. 
Jack Wilkinson testified that he went to Salt Lake City on the night in question to 
fix a car (R. 176: 149, 153). Wilkinson was in the rear, driver's side passenger seat when 
the vehicle was stopped near his home in Orem after returning from Salt Lake City (R. 
176: 147). Wilkinson further testified that no one was shuffling around in the back seat, 
as Officer Bebe earlier indicated (R. 176: 147). Wilkinson said that Bebe reached into the 
vehicle and into Wilkinson's shirt pocket (R. 176: 148). He also said that he was the first 
to exit the vehicle, not the driver, and that Bebe physically pulled him from the vehicle 
(R. 176: 147). Wilkinson denied having a dollar bill in his pants pocket and denied 
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having any methamphetamine on him at all (R. 176: 148-50, 152). Wilkinson testified 
that Bebe picked a dollar bill up from the ground after emptying Wilkinson's pockets (R. 
176: 150). 
F. Testimony of Officer Troy Bebe (Recalled) 
Officer Bebe refuted Wilkinson's claims that he was the first out of the vehicle 
and that he was physically pulled out of it (R. 176: 154). He also denied picking anything 
up off the ground during the stop (R. 176: 155). Finally, Bebe testified that Mary Albert 
told him that she did not buy methamphetamine in Salt Lake City, but Wilkinson did (R. 
176: 159). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The search and seizure of Wilkinson was not justified by reasonable, articulable 
suspicion and therefore violates the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. Because the confidential informant's tip did not implicate 
Wilkinson, and because the furtive movements of passengers in the car do not give rise to 
reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed, police had no reasonable suspicion 
that Wilkinson had committed a crime, was about to commit a crime, or was armed and 
dangerous. In addition, all evidence discovered after that unlawful detention must be 
excluded as fruits of the poisonous tree. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DENIAL OF 
WILKINSON'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS BECAUSE 
OFFICERS IMPROPERLY STOPPED THE VEHICLE IN 
WHICH WILKINSON WAS RIDING AND LACKED A 
REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT HE HAD COMMITTED A 
CRIME, 
Prior to trial, Wilkinson filed a motion to suppress alleging that the stop of Mary 
Albert's vehicle was improper because officers observed no traffic violations, and 
because of the lack of details in the tip from a confidential informant (R. 51). He also 
alleged that officers had no reasonable suspicion that he had committed a crime (R. 47-
46). On the day of the trial, Judge McVey denied the motion to suppress (R. 176: 69). 
Specifically, Judge McVey held that "[t]here was probable cause based on the 
information from the informant to stop the vehicle and to believe that the vehicle was 
containing drugs" (R. 176: 66-67). More directly, Judge McVey said that finding syringes 
"in the seat pocket where Mr. Wilkinson was sitting where his knees would have been" 
was grounds for an exception to the exclusionary rule. However, the testimony of Officer 
Bebe is clear that the two syringes were found on the opposite side of the car from where 
Wilkinson was sitting, (R. 176: 56), so Judge McVey's characterization of that evidence 
is clearly incorrect. Wilkinson asserts that the tip from the confidential informant was too 
vague to be relied upon by the officers, and that the officers had no reasonable suspicion 
that he was committing a crime. Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying his motion 
to suppress. 
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The seizure and subsequent search of Jack Wilkinson violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights, and he respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction and 
the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress, and remand this case the Fourth District 
Court for further proceedings. 
The tip from the confidential informant indicated only that Mary Albert had 
purchased methamphetamine and intended to sell some to the informant (R. 173: 4). The 
informant gave no indication that anyone else in the car had purchased, used or intended 
to sell methamphetamine or any other illegal substance (R. 173: 9). Therefore, even had 
the search and seizure of Albert been proper, Wilkinson's detention was not. The 
arresting officer had no reasonable suspicion or probable cause to search Wilkinson, even 
after stopping Albert's vehicle. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 
of the Utah Constitution guarantee citizens the right "right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures" 
without a warrant. This Court held that both driver and passenger are seized within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment when a police officer stops their car, and therefore 
both driver and passenger may challenge the constitutionality of the stop. State v. Baker, 
2008 UT App 115, t 10, 103 P.3d 699. The Court also said that 
[d]ue to the mobile nature of vehicles and their highly-regulated status, 
persons traveling in vehicles have a lesser expectation of privacy than they 
would have within a private dwelling. State v. James, 2000 UT 80, P 10, 13 
P.3d 576. And officers may temporarily detain a vehicle and its occupants 
upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity for the purpose of 
conducting a limited investigation of the suspicion. Id. This articulable 
suspicion must be that the person has committed or is about to commit a 
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crime; however the detention must be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 
616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Id. at Tf 11. Thus, any detention of drivers or passengers must be pursuant to a reasonable 
suspicion that they have or were about to commit a crime, and seizures must be limited to 
the scope of the suspicion. The exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment, applied to 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, dictates that evidence seized by and 
through an illegal search and seizure must be suppressed and not admitted for the court's 
consideration. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). For these reasons, the denial of 
Wilkinson's motion to suppress and his conviction should be reversed. 
A. The officers waiting for Albert's vehicle failed to corroborate the 
confidential informant's tip when they stopped the vehicle before 
reaching Albert's residence, and when they found no drugs on 
Albert. 
The confidential informant's tip was insufficient to effectuate a stop of Albert's 
vehicle. This Court has held that an informant's tip can create reasonable suspicion, and 
established a three-part test to determine whether reliance on an informant's tip was 
based on reasonable suspicion. Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997). The factors to consider are (1) "the type of informant involved"; (2) 
"whether the informant gave enough detail about the observed criminal activity to 
support the stop"; and (3) "whether the police officer's personal observations confirm the 
dispatcher's report of the informant's tip." Id. at 235-36. In Mulcahy, a citizen informant 
contacted police to report a possible drunk driver. Id. at 233. Because the citizen provided 
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enough detail about the driver and the car, and because the police officer was able to 
corroborate the informant's statements upon stopping the car; the Court held that the 
informant was reliable, and that the stop and detention of the driver was "supported by 
reasonable suspicion based on the specific, articulable facts" provided by the informant. 
Id at 238. 
Here, the informant's tip was specific about Albert and her car, and the type of 
offense being committed, but the tip did not implicate Wilkinson (R. 173: 9). 
Additionally, the police stopped the car before the tip could actually be corroborated. 
Moreover, Bebe did not stop the vehicle for any traffic violation, which would have 
provided a reason to initiate a stop, (R. 176: 42): the officers waiting in the unmarked 
minivan near Albert's residence merely observed her vehicle turn onto the street on 
which they were parked, (R. 173: 5), and then stopped the vehicle. 
The informant only told police that the scheduled methamphetamine buy was to 
take place at Albert's residence, (R. 173: 4), but the officers waiting in the minivan 
initiated the traffic stop more than 400 feet before the vehicle reached Albert's residence, 
(R. 176: 39), rather than wait for Albert to reach her home and exit the vehicle or 
otherwise make contact with the buyer. Furthermore, no drugs were found on Albert 
during the stop, (R. 176: 53), unlike Mulcahy, where the officer was able to fully 
corroborate the informant's tip that the driver was drunk, thus committing a crime. 
Accordingly, Bebe initiated the traffic stop before the informant's tip that Albert was 
going to sell drugs out of her home could actually be corroborated, and the informant's 
report that Albert had purchased methamphetamine lacked any corroborative evidence, as 
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no drugs were found on Albert. This means that the third factor of the Mulcahy test has 
not been met. The reliability of the informant—in light of the first factor of the test— 
becomes suspect because of the lack of evidence against Albert. Even if the Court finds 
that the three factors are met in relation to Albert and the traffic stop, they were not met 
in relation to Wilkinson. 
B. Both the tip from the confidential informant and the totality of 
the circumstances were insufficient to create a reasonable 
suspicion as a basis for the warrantless search and seizure of 
Wilkinson. 
Wilkinson was not included in the confidential informant's report, and therefore 
the officers searched Wilkinson without reasonable suspicion to do so. Nothing in the 
Record indicates that the confidential informant indicated either that Wilkinson was 
going to sell him methamphetamine, or that Wilkinson was even in the car (R. 173: 9). 
The informant only told police that Albert had methamphetamine to sell to him (R. 173: 
4). After stopping the car, and while searching the driver, Officer Bebe told all the 
passengers in the car that they were under investigation, and thus not free to leave, (R. 
173: 14), making Wilkinson's detention a level two encounter without the necessary 
initial "'specific and articulable facts and rational inferences'" that would "'give rise to a 
reasonable suspicion a person has or is committing a crime.'" State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 
125, \ 35 (quoting United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir. 1990)). 
Nothing in the Record indicates that the informant told police that Wilkinson had been or 
was about to be involved in committing a crime, so when Officer Bebe asked Wilkinson 
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to exit the vehicle, he had no reasonable suspicion to do so. In short, Officer Bebe had no 
specific or articulable fact stemming from the informant's tip that related to Wilkinson 
that could have given rise to reasonable suspicion that Wilkinson was committing a 
crime. 
The initial purpose of the traffic stop being to investigate a tip suggesting Albert 
was transporting methamphetamine to sell, (R. 176: 36-38), the officers needed 
reasonable suspicion to proceed beyond the initial purpose of the stop and detain and 
search Wilkinson. See State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994). "Reasonable 
suspicion means suspicion based on specific, articulable facts drawn from the totality of 
the circumstances facing the officer at the time of the stop." Id. The only thing facing the 
officer in relation to Wilkinson at the time of the stop was a syringe cap on the floor 
toward the rear of the driver's seat (R. 173: 5)—hardly enough to constitute reasonable 
suspicion. The syringe cap could just as easily be a component of a syringe used by a 
diabetic to inject insulin. 
In its ruling on the motion to suppress, the trial court also said that "the syringes 
were discovered right in front of—in the seat pocket where Mr. Wilkinson was sitting 
where his knees would have been," and that "there would have been probable cause to 
arrest based on the location of those syringes" (R. 176: 68). This finding is clearly 
erroneous because Bebe's testimony was clear that the syringes were found "in the rear 
seat, the back of the front seat passenger," in a pocket "on the passenger side" (R. 176: 
56). This puts the syringes on the opposite side of the car from where Wilkinson was 
sitting. 
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C. Officer Bebe did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that 
Wilkinson or other passengers were armed and dangerous, and 
therefore the initial Terry frisk of Wilkinson was improper. 
The "furtive movements" made by one or more passengers in the back seat of the 
vehicle were insufficient to create a reasonable suspicion that Wilkinson was engaged in 
criminal activity, State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1137 (Utah 1989), and the syringe 
cap on the floor next to the driver's seat was insufficient to create a reasonable suspicion 
that Wilkinson had engaged in criminal activity. Therefore, Bebe lacked the necessary 
"reasonable and articulable suspicion that [Wilkinson] was armed and dangerous," State 
v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ^  32, 103 P.3d 699, and improperly conducted a Terry frisk on 
Wilkinson. 
In Schlosser, police observed the defendant, a passenger in the vehicle being 
stopped, "bending forward, acting fidgety, turning to the left and to the right, and turning 
back to look at the officer." Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1133. The officer opened the 
defendant's door and asked for his identification, id., and the Court held that the opening 
of the door constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, id. at 
1137. The Court further held that "[mjere furtive gestures of an occupant of an 
automobile do not give rise to an articulable suspicion suggesting criminal activity." Id. 
In Brake, the Court held that "a traditional Terry frisk requires that the officer 
have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous." Brake, 
2004 UT 95, f 32. The Court also cited a previous holding in which it said that 
"reasonable suspicion requires an objectively reasonable belief that an individual is 
engaged in or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." Id. (citation omitted). 
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Therefore, for the Terry frisk of Wilkinson to be proper, Bebe was required to have 
objectively and reasonably believed that Wilkinson was engaged in criminal activity, and 
that he was armed and dangerous, prior to the frisk. The Court went on to say that some 
exceptions to the reasonable suspicion rule exist, but that "for other types of crimes, such 
as trafficking in small quantities of narcotics . . . there must be particular facts which 
lead the officer to believe that a suspect is armed." Id. (citation omitted). 
Here, Bebe testified that it was the furtive movements of the passengers that 
caused him to have concern for his safety (R. 173: 5). Like Schlosser, however, "mere 
furtive gestures of an occupant of an automobile do not give rise to an articulable 
suspicion suggesting criminal activity." Combined with the definition of reasonable 
suspicion provided by Brake, Bebe's stated reason for conducting a Terry frisk on the 
vehicle's occupants, including Wilkinson—that the furtive movements caused him to fear 
for his and his colleagues' safety—is insufficient. Furthermore, if furtive movements of 
passengers in a vehicle do not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, 
they hardly give rise to reasonable suspicion that one or more passengers are armed and 
dangerous. 
Bebe pointed to no observances, no other "particular facts," other than the furtive 
movements of passengers that caused him to be concerned for his safety, yet the trial 
court still held that "there was a reasonable suspicion . . . at a minimum to ask 
[Wilkinson] to come out and get patted down" (R. 176: 67). The trial court also said that 
once Wilkinson had been patted down, "the officer would have . . . had reason to further 
the search in order to . . . make sure that there weren't any weapons" (R. 176: 68). The 
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trial court's ruling in this respect is clearly erroneous because, given that Bebe had no 
reasonable suspicion that Wilkinson was engaged in criminal activity, the only other 
alternative route to searching Wilkinson's person was a Terry frisk. However, the Terry 
frisk was improper at its inception because, as Bebe testified, he conducted the frisk for 
his safety after seeing ftirtive movements in the back seat of the vehicle (R. 173: 5). And 
as stated earlier, ftirtive movements are insufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion 
because the passengers in the vehicle could have been "doing a host of other innocuous 
things," and "[a] search based on such common gestures and movements is a mere 
'hunch,' not an articulable suspicion that satisfies the Fourth Amendment." Schlosser, 
774P.2dat 1138. 
The purpose of the stop was for "trafficking in small quantities of narcotics," a 
crime specifically excluded from the list of exceptions to the Terry frisk rule in Brake, 
and prior to the stop, Bebe did not even have an indication that Wilkinson was in the car 
or trafficking narcotics (R. 173: 9). Furthermore, Bebe did not think that Wilkinson may 
have had a weapon until he had already pulled items out of his pockets (R. 176: 57). 
Therefore, the initial Terry frisk of Wilkinson was improper because it was based solely 
on passengers' ftirtive movements, which do not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity or to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that suspects are armed and 
dangerous. Thus, the evidence seized as a result of the subsequent search of Wilkinson 
should have been suppressed. 
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CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Wilkinson respectfully requests that this Court reverse his conviction and the trial 
court's denial of his motion to suppress, and remand this case to the Fourth District Court 
for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of July, 2008. 
Margaret P. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
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MICHAEL J. PETRO (4241) 
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO 
Attorneys for Defendant 
75 South 300 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801) 379-0700 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Plaintiff, : 
v. 
Case No. 061402130 
JACK VIRGIL WILKINSON, JR., : 
Defendant. : Judge Samuel D McVey 
The above-named Defendant, by and through his counsel of record, John A.. Penrod of 
Young, Kester & Petro, moves the Court to suppress any and all evidence, including statements-
obtained by Detective Beebe and the Utah County Task Force as a result of search and seizure of 
the Defendant. This motion is made pursuant to Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and the accompanying 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
DATED this?fc day of ' j ^ X ^ C , , 2006. 
4 JOHTC A. PENROD 
Attorney for Defendant 
Obu0^4 
JOHN A PENROD(9644) 
YOLNG, KESTER & PETRO 
Attorneys for Defendant 
75 South 300 West 
Provo, 'Utah 84601 
Telephone (801)379-0700 
INTHEFOVRfH fUDICIAl DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OI Ul AH 
?T \TE OF U TAH, : MEMORANI)U W OF POINTS AND 
AlTHORITIf "^  IN SUPPORT OF 
Plaintiff, . DEFENDANTS MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Cast: No 06 J 10!1 30 
JACK VIRGIL WILKINSON, JR . 
Defendant. : »u,ige Sanaiei <» McVey 
The Defendant, Jack Wilkinson, hy and through his cc un->el of record, John A Penrod of 
Young, Kester & Petro, submits the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support ot Defendant's Motion to Suppress any and all evidence obtained as a result of Task 
Forces's stop and subsequent detention of the D.;ie'jdant 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about May 24, 2006, the Detective 1 roy 'Reebe -md members of the Utah 
Comity Task Force stopped and detained the Defendant based upon a confidential informant's 
information. 
2. The Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle (the "Vehicle") that was occupied by 
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the Defendant and four other individuals. 
3. The confidential informant contacted Detective Beebe and told him that Mary 
Albert, who was one of the four other occupants in the Vehicle, was going to Salt Lake City to 
pick-up an amount of methamphetamine. Detective Beebe, at the preliminary hearing, claimed 
the confidential informant was a reliable informant but did not provide any supporting details. 
4. The confidential informant did not witness any illegal conduct by any of the 
occupants of the Vehicle, including Ms. Albert. 
5. The confidential informant had arranged to purchase some methamphetamine 
from Ms. Albert. 
6. Ms. Albert allegedly called the informant and claimed that she was returning from 
Salt Lake City but that she was going to make at least one stop. The informant than called back 
and asked Ms. Albert where she was located. She stated that she was traveling to her home. 
7. Detective Beebe and the Task Force stopped the Vehicle approximately one house 
away from Ms. Albert's house. The confidential informant never disclosed any information 
concerning whether any of the other occupants of the Vehicle were involved in any drug activity. 
The confidential informant did state that the Vehicle was being driven by Ms. Albert's son. 
8. Detective Beebe testified, at the preliminary hearing, that immediately after he 
stopped the Vehicle, he pulled the driver out of the vehicle. In the process, he observed a syringe 
cap at the left of the driver's seat. 
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9. Immediately after removing the driver from the vehicle, Detective Beebe opened 
the back, driver's side passenger's door and pulled the Defendant out of the vehicle. Before 
doing anything else, Detective Beebe conducted an investigative search of the Defendant's 
person and allegedly found an illegal substance on the Defendant's person. 
10. Detective Beebe claims that he removed, detained and searched the Defendant's 
person and the other individuals in the Vehicle based upon the confidential informant's 
information, the syringe cap and the alleged furtive movements made by the occupants of the 
vehicle. 
11. Detective Beebe and the informant observed no illegal conduct on behalf of any of 
the occupants of the Vehicle prior to stopping the Vehicle and detaining its occupants. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TASK FORCE'S SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE DEFENDANT 
WAS ILLEGAL BECAUSE DETECTIVE BEEBE AND THE TASK 
FORCE DID NOT HAVE REASONABLE SUSPICION TO INITIATE A 
STOP OF THE VEHICLE. 
A. The Detention of the Defendant By the Task Force Constitutes a Seizure under 
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I. Section 14 
of the Utah Constitution. 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution guarantees the right of a person "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects against unreasonable search and seizures." The right to be free from an unreasonable 
search and seizure extends to a person's vehicle. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 
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(1979); Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah App. 1992). 
In determining whether a traffic stop is constitutionally reasonable, the court makes a 
"dual inquiry: (1) was the police officer's action 'justified at its inception5? and (2) was the 
resulting detention 'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference 
in the first place?'" State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-32 (Utah 1994) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968)). In the case at hand, the stop of the Vehicle was not justified at its 
inception, and alternatively, if the Court finds that it was justified, the investigative search of the 
Defendant went beyond the scope that justified the stop in the first place. Accordingly, all 
evidence in this matter should be suppressed. 
B. The Stop of the Vehicle Was Not Justified at its Inception. 
A traffic stop is justified at its inception when the officer has "reasonable articulable 
suspicion that the driver is committing a traffic offense, such as driving under the influence of 
alcohol or driving without a license. . . [or that] the driver is engaged in more serious criminal 
activity, such as transporting drugs." Lopez, 873 at 1132. In the present case, Detective Beebe 
and the Task Force did not have the necessary "reasonable articulable suspicion" to stop the 
Vehicle because Detective Beebe did not witness any traffic violations or any other objective 
factors that would show that any one in the Vehicle was engaged in criminal activity. 
Furthermore, the alleged confidential informant did not provide enough details to the Task Force 
that amounted to the necessary reasonable articulable suspicion to stop the Vehicle. 
4 
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In Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.3d 231 (1997), the Utah Court of Appeals set forth a 
three prong test to determine whether an officer's reliance on an informant's tip was based on 
reasonable suspicion. See id. at 234. Those three factors include: (1) "the type of informant 
involved,'f (2) "whether the informant gave enough detail about the observed criminal activity to 
support the stop," and (3) "whether the police officer's personal observations confirm the 
dispatcher's report of the informant's tip." Id. at 235-36. In the case at hand, the confidential 
informant's information fails because the second and third factor, and possibly the first factor, 
shows that reasonable suspicion did not exist when Detective Beebe stopped the Vehicle. 
At the preliminary hearing, Detective Beebe testified that the confidential informant is a 
reliable informant. The detective, however, did not testy as to why the informant was reliable. 
As such, the Defendant submits that he was not reliable. 
As to the second Mulcahy factor, the informant did not give enough information in this 
case to justify stopping the Vehicle. The informant gave no information concerning whether the 
driver of the Vehicle, Ms. Albert's son, was actually involved in transporting drugs nor did he 
give any details as to the other occupants in the Vehicle and whether any of those occupants were 
involved in transporting or possessing drugs. Morever, the confidential informant did not 
witness Ms. Albert purchase drugs, did not observe any drugs in the Vehicle or on Ms. Albert's 
person, nor did he observe Ms. Albert drive her vehicle. The only information the confidential 
informant obtained were alleged statements made by Ms. Albert. 
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The Mulcahy Court concluded that a "tip is more reliable if it is apparent that the 
informant observed the details personally, instead of simply relaying on information from a third 
party." See id. at 943 P.2d at 236. The confidential informant in the present case did not 
personally observe any details. The informant's lack of personal observation gives a lack of 
reasonable suspicion. For instance, in the case of State v. Grovier, 808 P.3d 133 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991), the Court found that the informant's information was reliable. In that case, the informant 
observed methamphetamine in the defendant's vehicle, saw the defendant in the vehicle and gave 
the vehicle's license plate number. Id. at 135. In the case at hand, the informant observed 
nothing. He simply carried on an alleged conversation via a cell phone with one of the occupants 
of the vehicle. 
Furthermore, in relying on a confidential informant, their "must be no hint of 
fabrication." Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 236. Without the informant observing any illegal conduct, 
including any drugs, the occupants of the Vehicle, the actual vehicle, or whether any of the 
occupants besides Ms. Albert were involved in transporting drugs, there is a hint of fabrication in 
what he allegedly disclosed to the Task Force. The Task Force was relying solely on a third 
party's report through the informant to justify the Task Force's stop of the Vehicle and detention 
of it's occupants. 
As to the final Mulcahy factor, even though the officers observed Ms. Alberts' vehicle, 
the officers also did not observe any evidence or factors that would show that the occupants of 
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the vehicle, let alone the dnver, were transporting drugs 
Moreover, the Task Force had no evidence to connect the dnver of the Vehicle and the 
Defendant to transporting drugs In State v Potter, 863 P 2d 40 (Utah Ct App 1993), the Court 
concluded that an officer "must be able to articulate some unlawful or suspicious behavior 
connecting the detainee to the suspected cnmmal activity " Id at 43 In the Potter case, the 
defendant was pulled ovei after leaving a house that the officers were attempting to obtain a 
search warrant to search Id at 41 In the present case, the Defendant was simply ndmg m the 
same vehicle as Ms Albert, who claimed to have allegedly purchased drugs m Salt Lake City 
The informant provided no information that the Defendant nor the dnver were with Ms Albert 
when she allegedly purchased drugs or that either of them had any drugs on his person The Task 
Force had no articuable information that the Defendant or the dnver of the Vehicle were involved 
m any cnmmal activity 
The information provided by the confidential informant to the Task Force did not give the 
Task Force the necessary reasonable suspicion to stop the Vehicle According, the Court should 
suppress all evidence obtained m this matter 
II. THE TASK FORCE'S SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE DEFENDANT 
WAS ILLEGAL BECAUSE THE TASK FORCE DID NOT HAVE 
REASONABLE SUSPICION OF ANY ILLEGAL CONDUCT BY THE 
DEFENDANT. 
In the alternative to the above argument, if the Court finds that there was reasonable 
suspicion to stop the Vehicle, the Defendant argues that the subsequent search and seizure of the 
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Defendant was unlawful. 
Under Utah law concerning whether a law enforcement officer has reasonable suspicion 
to proceed beyond the initial purpose of a traffic stop, "[reasonable suspicion means suspicion 
based on specific, articulable facts drawn from the totality of circumstances facing the officer al 
the time of the stop." Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132. In the case at hand, the Task Force was provided 
information concerning Ms. Albert's alleged purchase of methamphetamine in Salt Lake City. 
However, there was no information that the Defendant was involved in any illegal activity. 
When Detective Beebe approached the Vehicle - after making the initial stop, he 
immediately pulled the driver out of the Vehicle. At that point, he observed a syringe cap to the 
left of the driver's seat and decided to remove the Defendant and search his person. 
In determining whether reasonable suspicion existed for the Task Force to remove the 
Defendant and immediately search his person, the suspicion is "reasonable if it is supported by 
specific and articulable facts as well as any rational inferences drawn from those facts." State v. 
Alverez, 563 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, |14, 2006 UT 61, (Utah 2006). The only specific facts that the 
Task Force had when they stopped the vehicle was that Ms. Albert had allegedly been to Salt 
Lake City to purchase methamphetamine. In addition to that fact, Detective Beebe observed a 
syringe cap. He observed nothing more. The Defendant was not linked to purchasing any drugs, 
and a syringe cap, without more, tells nothing. Accordingly, Detective Beebe only had, at most, 
a "hunch" that the Defendant was involved in criminal activity. "[A] hunch, without more, does 
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not raise a reasonable articulable suspicion regardless of the final result." Godina-Luna, 826 
P.2d at 655 (Utah 1992) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 7). Detective Beebe did not have a reasonable 
suspicion that the Defendant was involved in criminal activity, and consequently, his search of 
the Defendant was constitutionally unlawful 
Furthermore, in Detective Beebe's report, he noted that he pulled the driver and 
passengers out for safety purposes; however, he mentions nothing about observing any weapons. 
He based his reasoning on observations of alleged furtive movements and the confidential 
informant's information. There is no facts that show the officers' safety was in jeopardy. 
III. THE TASK FORCE'S VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
REQUIRES THAT ALL EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY THE TROOPERS 
BE SUPPRESSED. 
Utah case law is clear that any evidence obtained following an illegal search and seizure 
must be suppressed. State v. Small, 829 P.2d 129 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). All of the evidence with 
respect to the Defendant's alleged illegal conduct in the present case is directly tied to Detective 
Beebe and the Task Force's illegal stop and subsequent illegal search and seizure of the 
Defendant. Accordingly, all of the evidence against the Defendant must be suppressed. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated in this memorandum, the evidence obtained in this matter by 
Detective Beebe and the Task Force must be suppressed. 
DATED this ]Jfi day of 4 > c C 200_£? 
W^\2-^J 
JOHN A. PENROD 
Attorney for Defendant 
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